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Abstract: Using Peirce as a guide, this paper explores the way in which light mediates finitude 
through the relational process of semiosis. Embodying the triadic logic of identity, difference and 
return, light creates space, time and matter. Attention is on simple bodily forms and the meta-
physics of their relationality. The first section introduces the mathematical and metaphysical 
contours of Peirce’s approach. The second section motivates Peirce’s three categories as 
interwoven process. In the third section, Peirce’s formalism of the sign is presented and applied 
to simple physical and biological bodies. 
 
 
Prelude: In the beginning …  
 
Lau Tzu once wrote that knowing the ancient beginning is the essence of the way [Tao Te Ching, 
Verse 14]. But what do we mean by beginning? And what kind of beginning should we seek? 
Temporal? Causal? Formal? Logical?  
 
To seek the beginning is to embark on a journey of self-emptying and return to the source. 
Beginnings, like horizons, are elusive, always just beyond our grasp. The beginning is always 
already past. It is potentially significant to contrast in the beginning with the more common 
philosophical conception of foundation or ground. The ground, the earth, the land, is a given 
structure which supports or hosts beings in their relationship with one another. It is spatial, total, 
all at once. In the most abstract sense, the ground might be thought of as a geo-metry of space; a 
lawful, mathematical basis for the presence of individuals as individuals, be they particles or 
persons. The abstracted ground—space—sustains identity but it does not grant identity. In itself, 
it is not creative. The abstracted ground is the domain of the same, to use the terminology of 
Hegel [1977] or Levinas [2002]. If we seek to find the source of identity in the ground alone, in 
the same, we encounter the empty void.  
 
Returning to the beginning draws us away from the emptiness. We encounter difference, 
asymmetry, that which has no equal:  
 
And darkness was on the face of the deep.  
And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. [Genesis 1.2] 
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The earth, without form, might be said to be void, but beyond a found image of emptiness, 
beyond the geo-metry of space, is in the beginning. To cut ourselves off from the beginning is to 
make for ourselves a geometry of being which is cut off from the source. Without mediation, the 
transcendent becomes the excluded middle of a binary logic whose form is the empty reflection 
of what we take to be our Self. To draw away from the empty void is to understand ourselves 
differently and, in so doing, a new heaven and a new earth come into view. 
 
And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. [Genesis 1.3] 
 
In this paper2, using Peirce as a guide, I explore the way in which light mediates finitude through 
a process of semiosis. Here attention is on simple bodily forms and the meta-physics of their 
relationality. The first section introduces the mathematical and metaphysical contours of Peirce’s 
approach. The second section motivates Peirce’s three categories as interwoven process. In the 
third section, Peirce’s formalism of the sign is presented and applied to simple physical and 
biological bodies. The final section is an abductive leap.  
 
 
First Movement: Mathematics, metaphysics and music 
 
In Songs for Relinquishing the Earth, Zwicky [1998] writes of how, in the end of mourning, we 
must pass through “that absence in ourselves”. Awareness of absence becomes an opening whose 
sense, for Zwicky, is musical. A path of listening. 
To listen is to enter into a place of open expectation. Listening is deeply temporal. It involves 
attention to what lies beneath, within, or beyond—what is passing through—the momentary 
present or current state. Listening dissolves the earth as brute fact by signifying something more 
or greater or yet to be. The ear is a womb. Let this metaphor sit uncomfortably in our minds for 
the time being. 
Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica is said to unite heaven and earth in a 
calculus of difference. Let us take this as the ground for our exploration. The limiting form of the 
differential operator in Newton’s theory becomes, for Peirce, a sign of the infinite as 
infinitesimal. Like “infinity”, the infinitesimal is a tricky (non)-concept that perches on the edge 
of signification. Modern analysis, which provides the formal mathematical basis for differential 
calculus, involves the use of infinite series to limit, contain or perhaps even exclude the 
infinitesimal. Peirce questions the way modern analysis circumvents the infinitesimal [Herron 
1977] through the use of convergent, infinite series whose limits are never reached: “… the 
doctrine of limits has been invented to evade the difficulty, or, as some say, to explain the 
significance of the word ‘infinitesimal’” [Law of Mind, 537]. He is particularly critical of formal 
approaches to differential calculus (and the related treatment of limits or boundaries) in which 
 
2 Previous explorations focused on the way in which light becomes a sign of the absolute in modern theories of 
physics [Rogers, 1-11]. There light was found to be an irreducibly threefold operator invoking identity, difference 
and return. It creates time, space and matter through the principles of relativity theory such that the quantum 
ontology of the latter is consequent to the triadic form of light.  
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the infinitesimal becomes void—an excluded middle or symmetric cut that is assumed to define 
the relationship of proximity between Real numbers or points on a line, for example. With these 
approaches, each number or point is absolutely differentiated from its neighbour in the way that 
individual members in a class are separated from one another. But the cut itself, which is the 
limit where one number or point merges into its neighbour, is excluded3. Peirce claims that this is 
a false conception of continuity because a continuum contains its limits [Law of Mind, 544]. The 
absolute cut of analysis is a binary operation that results in a symmetric relationship between the 
two sides of the cut. Peirce questions whether this symmetry actually obtains, even for Real 
numbers. 
Instead, Peirce argues for a different conception of continuity which he calls synechism. Unlike 
the continuum of modern analysis in which each element or member—each part—is a separate 
individual, in Peirce’s continuum the individual parts blur into one another such that they do not 
have completely separate identity. He takes the flow of time as an archetype in which each 
moment flows out of a past moment and into a future moment. Whereas analysis assumes, as its 
ground, the independent identity of foundational elements (points in time, for example), Peirce 
argues that the identity of any part must derive from the whole to which it belongs. To introduce 
his concept of continuity, he turns his attention to the infinitesimal which he treats as an interval. 
For Peirce, however, the formal structure of the infinitesimal interval is triadic, containing a 
beginning, middle and end (in contrast to the binary cut of modern analysis and the unitary form 
of the point). And unlike modern analysis, successive intervals overlap such that the beginning of 
the next is the middle of the former and the middle of the next is the end of the former. The 
overlap, or redundancy, is what enables the finite objectivity of the world. However, this 
objectivity is a mediated process which always involves an interpreter. As we will explore 
further in the paper, Peire’s infinitesimal results in the formation of finite, “whole” images within 
a diffuse background of potentiality. The mediation is intentional and based on a process of 
abstraction involving inferential relatedness (eg inferential comparison) and pattern recognition.  
For Peirce, all objects or bodies can be considered interpreters in some sense. For example, an 
electron might be considered an interpreter of quantum spin4. To say that all bodies can be 
considered interpreters means that they possess an interiority that is in a mediated relationship 
with the world. However, this way of speaking can also be misleading because the classical 
concept of a body as a separable “object” does not hold in Peirce’s approach. In a sense, Peirce’s 
infinitesimal is a formal property of interiority that grounds, exteriorizes, spatializes time.  
There is also an inherent uncertainty principle or randomness with Peirce’s concept of continuity 
which he calls tychism. Tychism is a property of “being-with” that conditions relatedness. The 
indeterminate, resonant structure of the quantum vacuum might be taken as an example5. In a 
sense, tychism is a formal property of external localization or extension that animates, 
interiorizes, temporalizes space. Peirce critiques a classical conception of space as an empty, 
inert container for the localization of properties or qualities. According to Peirce, no quality can 
 
3 For an extended exploration of the breakdown of the differential operator in the non-Euclidean space of relativity 
theory, see Rogers, The Proximity of Light: a deconstruction of space. 
4 For a discussion of how an electron is an interpreter of spin, see Rogers, Light as the Origin of Origins: How the 
ontological form of quantum mechanics is consequent to the principles of relativity theory. 
5 For an extended discussion of the resonant structure of the quantum vacuum, see Rogers, A Physicist’s Guide to 
[Hegel’s] Phenomenology of Spirit: Resonance, disambiguation and the genesis of spatial orientation. 
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be unambiguously given or assigned to all “points” in a spatial domain. By way of illustration, he 
considers the example of a surface that is part red and part blue “so that every point on it is either 
red or blue, and, of course, no part can be both red and blue.” “What, then,” he asks, “is the 
colour of the boundary between the red and the blue?” [Law of Mind, 545]. Peirce concludes that 
the quality of colour cannot be assigned to an isolated point; rather, it is spread over the 
immediate neighbourhood of a point. Within extended domains of red or blue, this is not 
particularly problematic because the neighbourhoods of all points have the same quality. 
However, the boundary itself is half red and half blue. It is as if points on the boundary have an 
indeterminate potential to be either red or blue. Peirce likens this ambi-valent boundary to the 
nature of the temporal present, which is half past and half to come. The ambivalent, ambiguous, 
indeterminate nature of the boundary is an opening to interiority. In the simple example of trying 
to assign a binary quality to points on a surface, Peirce encounters the boundary as the potential 
for quality. It is an interior state of indeterminacy, but more than that the boundary is a window 
into a prior potentiality for quality (i.e. red and blue) which has been actualized by the spatial 
domains. Peirce calls this opening into an interior state feeling, although in this context feeling 
does not refer to emotion but rather to a holistic inner state that may obtain for any interpreting 
entity from photons to persons. Perhaps a less anthropocentric term would be intentionality.  
The analytical notion that properties can be assigned to null, yet separate, Euclidean points of a 
spatial domain does not hold for Peirce. Instead, it would seem that space is always constituted 
by open domains whose interiorities resonantly interact with one another. The nature of the 
interaction depends, in part, on the scale. Space becomes an enabler of “objects” or bodies of 
varying degrees of complexity (such as electrons or organisms) which evolve in relationship with 
one another. Unlike the featureless inertness of the Euclidean point, the open kernel of spatial 
domains involves an inherent randomness or animation which is partly a consequence of the 
inseparability of “objects” or bodies. Randomness or tychism is a background quality of 
potentiality through which bodies are opened up to a mediated interiority or responsivity. For 
example, we might speculate that a massive body, conceptualized as a spatially localized entity, 
will always possess a resonant interior which is a consequence of its essential identity with and 
responsivity to other massive bodies. This is the way in which properties, like mass, might be 
embodied in space and time within Peirce’s metaphysical framework. 
Euclidean geometry, which is based on equality or sameness of all points, cannot accommodate 
ambiguous interiority or responsivity. In Euclidean geometry and its related differential calculus, 
the boundary is null or void—an excluded middle—and the infinitesimally extended domain or 
point is featureless or empty, lacking any potentiality. For Peirce, these assumptions involve a 
false image of relatedness. Since Newtonian physics is founded on a differential calculus of 
Euclidean geometry for both space and time, it results in a false determinism (or fatalism) which 
is void of novelty, creativity and, what Peirce calls, mind.   
Peirce takes mathematical form as metaphor for metaphysical form. In The Architecture of 
Theories, he writes “metaphysics has always been the ape of mathematics” [p174]. In that paper 
he uses projective geometry—in which an “infinite” space is mapped back onto itself—to 
critique a crucial metaphysical conjecture that can be located in the formalism of Euclidean 
geometry (i.e. projective parabolic geometry)6. This conjecture privileges sameness and subverts 
 
6 For further discussion, See Raposa [1989]. 
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inequality or otherness. The critique involves a comparison of the symmetry properties of 
parabolic (Euclidean) geometry versus hyperbolic geometry7 under projective transformations 
and then using this comparison as a figure or trope for understanding the limitations of the 
Newtonian or deterministic worldview. Roughly stated, Peirce contrasts a metaphysics of strings 
and points within an inert continuum (Euclidean or parabolic geometry) with a metaphysics of 
open domains and relationally mediated growth formed from an indeterminate continuum of 
potentiality (hyperbolic geometry).  
More specifically, in projective parabolic geometry, infinitely distant parts of any plane seen in 
perspective appear as a straight line or string. “Points”, which form the analytic foundation of 
Euclidean worlds, mark the ends or limits of a straight line. If a straight line extends to infinity in 
both directions, the end points (under projection) coincide as a single fixed point, called the 
Absolute. This coincidence is one way of understanding the translational symmetry of space. 
However, such a formalism cannot support asymmetry which Peirce claims is a key property of 
time. In hyperbolic geometry, by contrast, the Absolute remains two distinct entities under 
projection—an alpha and an omega. Asymmetry is built into hyperbolic geometry such that the 
universe can be said to spring from a chaos in the infinitely distant past to tend toward something 
different in the infinitely distant future.  
Additionally, in hyperbolic geometry, “the infinitely distant parts of any plane seen in 
perspective appear as a circle, beyond which all is blackness”8 [Peirce, Architecture of Theories, 
173]. The circle, which returns upon itself to form a mediating boundary for interior and exterior, 
is a central trope of Peirce’s theory that will be explored in this paper. Based on his metaphysical 
insights, Peirce speculates that the world in which we live is hyperbolic and not parabolic 
(Euclidean). This speculation predates the development of relativity theory (which is based on 
hyperbolic geometry) and his metaphysical insights may still have an important role to play in 
the interpretation of relativity theory. 
The theoretical form to be explored in this paper, which is guided by Peirce’s writing and its 
interpreters, might be roughly introduced as follows. “Bodies”—be they electrons or biological 
organisms or persons—come into being or emerge through a process of mediation. Bodies 
possess interiority which involves an open process of synchronization with the exterior world 
through which a response or future path can be “selected” from a set of possible paths. Interiority 
involves indeterminacy or randomness or “freedom” as a key constitutive element. However, this 
indeterminacy is conditioned by a structural framework which is formed in time and is indexed 
to a particular “present state” of the body. The structural framework forms a system that 
constrains the relationship between particular bodies of the same kind (a whole) such that bodies 
follow spatio-temporal paths governed by general laws or habits. The laws are stochastic in 
nature which is to say that they possess inherent randomness and uncertainty.  
The structural framework of general laws or habits limits the future possibilities or paths for a 
particular body at a particular time according to past determinations as illustrated in figure 1. 
 
7 Hyperbolic geometry is the geometry of Einstein’s theory of relativity, although Peirce’s article predates Einstein’s 
work. Peirce also considers the third possibility of elliptical geometry which will not be discussed here. 
8 A trope that perhaps is not unlike a black hole. 
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    Past   Present   Future 
  (Determined)        (Indeterminate)  (Possibilities) 
 
 
This form of temporality can be contrasted with the mechanistic determination that characterizes 
Newtonian physics as shown in figure 2. In the Newtonian framework, the “present state” is 
ultimately reducible to a “null point”, effectively erasing all trace of interiority, creativity and 
freedom. 
 




   Past     Present State  Future 
  (Determined)   (Determined)  (Determined) 
 
 
Bodies are formed by systems and systems are constituted by bodies. This is a progressive, 
evolutionary process that is mediated by “communication” or the flow of information. Bodies 
 
9 It should be noted that in this figurative treatment of time I have also partly borrowed from Wallace’s formal 




(only one will be 
selected) 
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may grow in complexity over time and higher order systems may emerge from lower order 
systems. Systems are ordered hierarchically such that the bodies at one level of order are formed 
into wholes which constitute the bodies of the next level. (For example, single cells at one level 
form into multicellular organisms at the next level of the hierarchy). Through this process there 
is a deepening of interior responsiveness and an expansion of capacity to process information 
from the external world to inform responses or re-actions. 
 
The elementary formal unit for this theory is the sign. A sign involves an irreducibly threefold 
relation in which a sign (as a vehicle for representation) stands for an object to which a response 
may be made by an interpretant. Bodies are formed through signs. (This statement may seem 
counterintuitive at first—see section 3 for further discussion.) Bodies of an identical type form 
degenerate systems or groups. However, the constituents of a group are not individuated to the 
extent that members of a class would be (in the mathematical theory of classes, for example.) 
Bodies constituting a group obtain individual identity through a resonant relatedness with one 
another. A body cannot be fully abstracted as a separately enduring Self10.    
 
How are we to think about this formalism? A carefully chosen image, like a map, might be 
helpful. In this regard, the form of metaphysics to be explored in this paper is like the form of 
music, particularly as described by Zuckerkandl [1973]. Bodies are tones. But music is not made 
of tones in the way a house is made of bricks. Rather, each tone is a momentary locus, 
incomplete in itself, yet anticipating the whole to which it belongs. Music occurs not through the 
analytical stepping from one tone to another, but in the spontaneous dancing through intervals 
between tones. Music is a system.  
 
A system in which the whole is present and operative in each individual locus, in which 
each individual locus knows, so to speak, its position in the whole, its relation to a centre, 
must be called a dynamic system. The dynamic qualities of tone can only be understood 
as manifestations of an orderly action of forces within a given system. The tones of our 
tonal system are events in a dynamical field, and each tone, as it sounds, gives expression 
to the exact constellation of force present at the point in the field at which the tone is 
situated. Musical tones are conveyors of forces. Hearing music means ‘hearing an action 
of forces’ [Zuckerkandl 1973, 36]. 
 
The rest of this paper involves an exploration of the irreducibly threefold or “triadic” form of 
Peirce’s metaphysical framework. Please bear in mind, however, that my prejudice is that the 
triadic form is greater than Peirce’s treatment11 and so, inevitably, other triadic formalisms are 
mixed into my interpretation of Peirce, including those of Levinas [2002], Hegel [1977], and, 




10 Although “bodies” are like objects in many respects, they lack self-contained identity. Rather the identity of a 
body comes from intentionality which involves mediation between interior and exterior. This is what makes 
Peirce’s concept of spatiality radically different from Newton’s concept. The featureless “point” is the Newtonian 
image of self-contained identity. For Peirce, the image of the point is a false image of the absolute.   
11 For further discussion, See Rogers, Three Reflections on Return: Convergence of form with regard to light, life and 
word. 
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Second Movement: The triadic form of gifting 
 
Why is there something rather than nothing? Guided by Peirce, our exploration of differential 
calculus and Euclidean geometry seems to lead us into the void. Null points joined by null 
connectors to form an inert, empty space of nothingness. We might call this an ontology of the 
same because it is based on the assumption that all points (in space and time) are equal; it 
subverts or excludes Otherness12. This is not just a mathematical pre-miss, it is also a 
metaphysical presumption. For example, Newtonian metaphysics begins with the elimination of 
the Otherness of heaven in relation to earth. The Same, to which all becomes related, is taken as 
the measure of the observer. This assumption of universal sameness seems to have led us to a 
false image of unity (for example, a false image of the unity of the Absolute). Much of twentieth 
century continental philosophy is a critique of an ontology of the same. Although we will not 
explore this critique here, Levinas would be a good guide for such a journey. 
 
There are two key insights that might help us move forward. The first comes from Aristotle. If 
we reflect on the things we find in the world, we might notice that they are organized in a 
hierarchy where species come from genera at increasingly higher levels of inclusiveness. For 
example, beagle from dog and dog from mammal and mammal from animal. Suppose, following 
this trail, we attempt to ascend to the highest genus or category, which we might call “being” or 
“essence”. What Aristotle and others have argued [see for example, Somers-Hall 2012] is that, if 
we want to speak about the substance of reality at the highest, simplest or most original level as a 
genus or category—that is to say, if we want to ask what reality is made of or what it consists of; 
if we want to question the nature of “being” or “essence”—then will be confronted with a 
paradox. The paradox occurs because the highest genus or category cannot be a unity, it must be 
heterogeneous in order for the hierarchy to be differentiated. The highest category must include 
both identity and difference in order for our world to be differentiated into a variety of things. 
Unity, or the One, is not a thing among things and cannot be categorized as such13. Unity is like 
pure potential that is beyond conceptualization. One consequence of this is that we cannot define, 
describe, or contain unity, we can only speak about it and only indirectly at that. 
 
The second insight comes from Augustine14. It is simply this: nothing is not something. What is 
challenging about the statement is that it appears to tell us something about nothing. This is 
misleading. The word “nothing” is not really a word like other words because its referent does 
not exist. Augustine says that what is really meant by the word “nothing” can be likened to a 
state of mind which seeks out something but fails to find it. This negating is purely temporal and 
implicitly binary. The problem with our exploration of mathematics so far is that we have rested 
on nothing as if it were something.  
 
The continual process of putting forward a conception of the One and then negating that 
conception in order to move beyond its limitations is a traditional path of contemplation called 
via negativa. It may lead to a personal experience of enlightenment but, because the outcome is 
 
12 For further discussion of the ontology of the same in Newtonian metaphysics, see Rogers, The Proximity of Light: 
A deconstruction of space. 
13 For further discussion, see Rogers, Beyond Space and Time: Unity and form in Augustine’s Confessions. 
14 For a discussion of Augustine’s treatment of “nothing”, see Rogers, Beyond Space and Time: Unity and form in 
Augustine’s Confessions. 
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pure experience, it cannot be exposited or taught or systematized. Any attempt to conceptualize 
unity—as being or essence for example—puts forward something which must then be negated in 
order to stay the course towards unity. The movement itself eludes our understanding. “Dimly 
we apprehend this double movement—that turning away from the primal ground by virtue of 
which the universe preserves itself in its becoming, and that turning toward the primal ground by 
virtue of which the universe redeems itself in its being … our knowledge of duality is reduced to 
silence by the paradox of the primal mystery” [Buber 1970, 149]. 
 
These two insights suggest that a philosophical understanding of reality cannot be grounded in a 
single category—such as being—as some analytical thinkers might expect, nor can it be held fast 
in duality—such as différance—which is always deconstructing what is posited. Our reflection 
on these insights seems to lead us to three and to Peirce’s metaphysics. 
 
Peirce’s theory is not foundational. He proposes three interwoven categories, called Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness. These categories animate and sustain a continuous evolutionary 
process that takes the form of growth or progressive learning. The process is both hierarchical 
(spatial) and emergent (temporal), such that higher levels of complexity are forged from lower 
levels. Each progressive level involves more intricate bodily forms with deeper interiority that 
grows in responsiveness and intentionality. The process is mediated by signs which also have a 
triadic structure. 
 
Peirce’s three categories are not fully individuated nor mutually exclusive. They flow in and 
through one another. They are not further reducible (for example, to a combination of unitary 
and/or binary categories). However, Peirce claims that any additional categories (for example, 
four or five categories) are reducible to three15.  
 
Because the three categories are not reducible, they cannot be individually defined per se. They 
relate as a whole such that their identities and their differences are brought into play at the same 
time. The more we speak about and work with the categories, the more clearly they might come 
into view16: 
• Firstness is “that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind 
anything” [Peirce, A Guess at the Riddle, 248]. It is potential that is not yet actual—pure 
indeterminacy that is dynamic and self-othering. Firstness only appears in and through 
Secondness and Thirdness. It is fresh, spontaneous, whole. Peirce often refers to firstness as 
quality. 
• Secondness is “that which is what it is by force of something to which it is second” [Peirce, A 
Guess at the Riddle, 248]. It is event, effect, otherness, compulsion. Secondness is 
constituted by things and facts which interact dyadically [Corrington 1993]. It is the domain 
of pure experience or “brute actuality”.  
• Thirdness is “that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates and which it 
brings into relation to each other” [Peirce, A Guess at the Riddle, 248]. It is mediation, laws 
and habits, generality. The Third connects the First and the Second and weaves “a fabric of 
 
15 The special status of three might be like the special status of triangles in Euclidean geometry to which all other 
polygons can be reduced. 
16 For a slightly different take on this formal triadic form, see Rogers, Beyond Space and Time: Unity and Form in 
Augustine’s Confessions. 
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concrete reasonableness in and through the world” [Corrington 1993]. The Third relates 
“things” to generalized “systems” from which Firstness re-emerges. 
 
According to Raposa [1989], the forming logic of Peirce’s three categories is like the irreducible 
triadic form of giving a gift or gifting. In the semantic structure: A gives C to B, relation can 
range over the three members of the triad as well as over different instances or sets of ordered 
triads. That is to say, there is a formal relationship of interiority between A, B and C, as well as a 
formal relationship of exteriority in the generalization of the instances of the fixed structure of A, 
B and C. Raposa contrasts the logic of gifting with the classical logic of exchange or equality 
which involves a binary semantical form: A is B. Interior and exterior are not differentiable with 
this latter form. Whereas the binary form operates through the concept of classes, Peirce’s 
threefold logic operates through systems.  
 
With binary or classical logic, individuals are members of a class (or set) which is, in some 
sense, eternally and simultaneously present as the collection of all members (i.e. it is spatialized, 
to use the terminology of geometry, or it is totalized to use Levinas’ terminology of ontology). 
The class constitutes the general from the particular individual members. Induction in classical 
logic involves sampling individual members to infer general properties of the whole class. 
Generality is deterministic, fixed, fatalistic, without freedom or choice. With triadic or 
systemical logic, generality is constituted in space and time from the system of relations of 
individuals (both interior and exterior). The development of systemical logic involves sampling 
of fragments of a system to infer the complete system. This process involves a combination of 
abduction (abstracting a finite body as a whole through “recognition” or “guessing”), induction 
(inference from particular instances to the general case) and deduction (a law-like process of 
testing inferences and guesses against experience). Systemical logic results in generality as a 
possibility that is conditioned by intentionality and habit (or repetition).   
 
Raposa [1989] calls systemical logic the logic of relatives. Classical logic can be seen as a 
degenerate form of systemical logic in which the totality of the system (i.e. as class) is given 
simultaneously or “totalized” all-at-once (eg. Structuralism). Classical logic is the logic of 
similitude in which members have a special relationship of identity [De Magalhaes, 1984]. The 
more expansive form of systemical logic is able to deal with systems that are not simultaneously 
synchronized, such as those encountered in the theory of relativity17. For such systems, members 
are not individuals in the classical sense—they are not completely distinguishable and their 
manifestation might be more aptly compared to the process of individuation encountered in 
quantum mechanics18. Systems are contingent, temporal, future-directed, emergent and 




17 Newton’s concept of “Absolute Space” (i.e. Euclidean geometry) might be seen as an example of a degenerate 
system that is simultaneous or totalized. Einstein’s theory of relativity, by contrast, takes light as a sign of the 
absolute through which synchronization happens as a process. For further discussion, see Rogers, The Proximity of 
Light: A deconstruction of Space. 
18 For further discussion, see Rogers, A Physicist’s Guide to [Hegel’s] Phenomenology of Spirit: Resonance, 
disambiguation and the genesis of spatial orientation. 
19 For further discussion, see Rogers, Towards the Case Against Reductionist Theories of Evolution. 
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Third Movement: A theory of signs 
 
The formal basis of Peirce’s theory is the sign. Unlike the binary relationship between signifier 
and signified that characterizes many theories of signs, for Peirce a sign is triadic in form. The 
three elements of a sign are: the sign-vehicle (also called representamen or simply “sign”) which 
stands for an object to which a response may be made by an interpretant [Robinson 2010]. The 
sign-vehicle does not signify anything in itself. Rather it is able to signify because it is affected 
or determined in some way by the object and, in turn, it is able to affect the interpretant. The 
interpretant is a change of state that allows the sign to mediate between the object and an 
interpreting entity. Often the interpretant will be a change in an interior state of an interpreting 
entity. For example, it may be an “image” or “thought” in someone’s mind (i.e. what is signified 
to someone by the sign). However, the interpreting entity need not be a person, it could be any 
object or body whose state may be changed in response to the sign (such as an electron or an 
amoeba). The triadic form of a sign is shown diagrammatically in figure 3. The sign-vehicle 
mediates a relationship between the object and the interpretant (represented by the loop in figure 
3) such that the interpretant may directly refer back to or re-present the object (represented by the 
dotted arrow).  
 
 
Figure 3: Triadic Form of a Sign 
    Sign-vehicle 
 
                   
              Object     Interpretant 
   
 
 
Through the sign, the relationship between the object and the interprent is asymmetrical. The 
sign-vehicle mediates (forward) a relationship between object and interpretant which then allows 
for a direct representational connection (backward) between interpretant and object. An 
interpretant may then serve as a sign for another interpretant and this process may continue 
indefinitely. Herein lies Peirce’s notion of the continuum—the triadic form of the sign is similar 
to the triadic form of the infinitesimal discussed earlier. 
 
Before going on to explore the formal properties of the sign, it might be helpful pause and reflect 
on how this form is related to the binary forms of classical logic and Newtonian mechanics. To 
that end, suppose there is a deterministic causal connection between the object and the 
interpretant. Then the change of state for the interpretant is caused by the object directly. For 
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example, smoke is caused by fire. In this instance, the sign-vehicle might be taken as null and the 
relationship might be seen as symmetric as shown in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Determinism Reduces the Sign-Vehicle to a Null Point 
 
      Sign-Vehicle (Null point) 
 
 
 Object (Fire)     Interpretant (Smoke)  
 
 
A purely symmetric relationship between cause and effect cuts off the sign-vehicle and, 
therefore, eliminates the possibility of a semantical relationship of meaning. That smoke refers to 
fire becomes purely tautological in a deterministic world. Such a world cannot support 
interiority, freedom, novelty or change20. It also cannot support information, meaning or 
language21. The triadic form of the sign, however, opens up to the extra-ordinary event of 





The sign is creative. Creativity is related to firstness. Through the sign, objects are abstracted or 
foregrounded as finite entities from a diffuse background. Abstraction is a process which 
involves repetition, reflection, or comparison and the objects are abstracted for an interpreting 
entity. Peirce calls the type of sign that characterizes this process an icon. Icons refer through 
likeness: the sign resembles its referent object in some qualitative way. Iconicity is the forebear 
of information, images and concepts.  
 
In human language, the creativity of the sign may be most apparent through the poetry—
figurative language that works in the realm of images and concepts, for example. For illustrative 
purposes, consider the following thought experiment. Let’s take “red” as an example of a simple 
concept and ask how it might come to have meaning for us. In its earliest inklings, the concept of 
red is embedded in the world as the possibility of quality—the particular suchness of that red 
 
20 For further discussion, see Wallace, Richard Taylor’s ‘Fatalism’ and the Semantics of Physical Modality. 
21 For further discussion, see Rogers, Is Dretske’s Theory of Information Naturalistically Grounded? How emergent 
communication channels reference an abstracted ontic framework. 
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apple on the tree. The redness can be foregrounded by the use of metaphor—that apple is the 
setting sun. The key property of metaphors is that they “contain the whisper it is and it is not” 
[Robinson 2010, 143]. This whisper is an echo of the double movement we encountered earlier 
in our discussion of negation. The apple is the setting sun (in some sense) and the apple is not the 
setting sun (in another sense). The tension or paradox between the “is” and the “is not” in the 
metaphor is a Second which is archetypal for icons. (Notice that a Third is also brought into play 
as the interpreter who is called to discover the sense.) The image of the red apple might now be 
used as iconic for other embedded instances of redness. This process will allow redness to begin 
to emerge as a distinct quality that appears repeatedly in the world. The process of abstraction is 
completed in the naming of this quality as “Red”. Once named, “red” can be defined as a 
concept. This simple thought experiment suggests that the abstract concept— what is meant by 
the term “red”—might emerge organically from a diffuse background of feeling through the use 
of iconic images as signs22. 
 
The creativity of the sign form, however, is not limited to human language. Biological organisms 
can also be understood as sign-interpreting processes. (This theoretical framework is called 
Biosemiotics and the primary unit of biosemiotic research is signs, rather than molecules or a 
cells [Emmeche 2011; Kull 2011]).  
 
Consider a single-celled amoeba as an example of a sign-interpreting body. The inner state of the 
amoeba is a potential interpretant that can respond to impinging forces from its environment. 
The impinging forces from the environment might be thought of as a diffuse background of 
random fluctuations for the amoeba that are reflected in an interior state of the amoeba that might 
be formally similar to Peirce’s notion of “feeling” (although this need not imply sensation, 
emotion, awareness or any other higher-order inner state.)  However, despite the randomness of 
the environment, it may be possible for the amoeba’s inner state to synchronize with other 
“bodies” in the environment if there is a “communication channel” between the external body 
and the amoeba. The communication channel might be any causal pathway that causes a change 
of interior state in the amoeba as a result the exterior body. Based on Shannon’s theory of 
information flow, the communication channel can establish a spatio-temporal scale of “coarse 
graining” or digitalization such that the interior state of the amoeba re-presents information about 
the state of the exterior body23.  The communication channel is like a resonant structure through 
which a (whole) pattern can be transmitted and “recognized”. The spatio-temporal scale of the 
pattern depends on the inter-relation between exterior body (transmitter), interpreter (receiver) 
and pathway of information flow (channel). In this way the exterior body may become a sign for 
the amoeba who may become an interpreter. The amoeba represents the external body as an 
interior state or “image” such that the interpretant emerges from a vague, diffuse background.  
 
However, in order for the amoeba to be an interpreting entity, two other conditions must also be 
met as discussed by Robinson [2010]. First, the external body must have a purpose for the 
amoeba, such as food or energy. It is this intentionality that generalizes particular interpretants to 
a category that makes sense to the amoeba. Second, not all external bodies to which the amoeba 
 
22 For an exploration of this creative process, see Rogers, danse sur glace: an experiment in language. 
23 For a discussion of this process of abstraction and its relationship to communications theory, see Rogers, Is 
Dretske’s Theory of Information Naturalistically Grounded? How emergent communication channels reference an 
abstracted ontic framework? 
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responds can serve the purpose. For example, if the purpose was food or energy, and the amoeba 
only responded to external bodies that served this purpose, then it would actually be a 
deterministic relationship rather than an interpretive one. For the inner state or interpretant to be 
a sign of food, it must be possible that sometimes the inner state obtains when the external body 
is not food. In other words, the external bodies to which the amoeba responds are sometimes 
food and sometimes not food. Again we encounter the mysterious whisper it is and it is not. 
Negation, which in this case might be called error, opens up for the amoeba the possibility of 
learning as the process for selecting true representations.  
 
Ollner [2010] has coined the term True Narrative Representations or TNRs to characterize 
representations which correspond with the external world and to differentiate them from noise or 
error. TNRs might be related to the concept of error-free signal transmission in communications 
theory24. Ollner has argued that TNRs are unique in their logical properties and that they 
optimize the principle of “least effort by which a dynamically well-fitted representation is to be 
preferred over one that does not fit so well” [Ollner, 2010, p641]. In an evolutionary theory25, it 
might be expected that TNRs would be selected because of their fitness. Creativity and 





The sign is responsive. Responsivity is related to secondness. Through the sign, abstracted 
bodies are brought into relation with one another and collectively they constitute a worldview. 
Responsivity is a process that involves action and reaction. It is the domain of experience. Peirce 
calls the type of sign that characterizes direct experiential encounter an index. Indices refer by a 
direct connection between the sign-vehicle and the object. This direct connection is governed by 
some form of law. For example, smoke can be taken as an index for fire because there is a causal 
law between fire and smoke. An index directly points to its object as significant or meaningful. 
 
In human language, the archetypal index is a name. The name is a direct pointer26 that forces 
attention on a particular object intended [De Magalhaes, 1984]. A name may point to a physical 
body or sensory constellation, such as that white horse in the field by the barn. It may also point 
to a mental image, such as the memory of the white horse or an imaginary white horse. Through 
repetition, the name becomes an identity operator for the interpreter that maps a single sign to 
multiple object-interpretant instances. In this way, an abstract concept can be formed as the 
intended unity among the instances. For example, “horse” may point to a particular horse as an 
object immediately present to the interpreter (a proper name). Through repetition, it may also 
point to different individual members of a group of horses such that the unifying object becomes 
 
24 For a discussion of this context for error and uncertainty in communication theory, see Rogers, Is Dretske’s 
Theory of Information Naturalistically Grounded? How emergent communication channels reference an abstracted 
ontic framework? 
25 For further exploration of the relation between evolution and semiotics, see Rogers, Towards the Case Against 
Reductionist Theories of Evolution. 
26 The “law” of the name is that it is a direct pointer. The personal discovery of this “law” is brilliantly described by 
the deafblind women Helen Keller in her autobiography The Story of My Life 
http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/keller/life/life.html 
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the interior quality or image that is similar to all instances. The name can then point to that 
image—for example, it can point to an imaginary horse as an invoked memory of the quality or 
image. Thus a name may bring a multiplicity of sensory and imaginative images into relationship 
as a single intended mental (i.e. interior) object—the concept of horse. The capacity of signs to 
abstract concepts for an interpreter obtains because an interpretant can itself be a sign for another 
interpretant. 
 
The name points but in itself it does not define its object. With physical objects like horses, the 
connection between the sign and its object may be immediately present to the interpreter because 
the physical body can be defined independently of the name, through interaction with a horse 
(such as touching, riding, feeding etc.). However, for general terms, like “red”, the connection 
between the sign and the object may only come fully into view through other signs. In our earlier 
thought experiment, metaphor opened up the possibility for the concept red and provided an 
indication of its sense. The name “red” provided an identity operator through which conceptual 
meaning could be formed progressively, although vaguely. However, the concept red only 
becomes defined as a concept when it is brought into relationship with other concepts. For 
example, a definition of red might include: red is a colour; and red is not blue. This process 
differentiates the ambiguous “is and is not” reference of metaphor into the logic of an excluded 
middle: “is” or “is not”. The grammatical form of the proposition is the fundamental relational 
unit for conceptual definition and propositions form logical structures of law-like relatedness 
called classical logic.  
 
Yet this picture of conceptual definition through logical structures cannot tell the full story. 
Conceptual definitions cannot be grounded in a single, coherent logical structure because if we 
take the structure of law-like relations between the terms of a language as the sole source of 
meaning for concepts then we encounter a paradox27. Suppose, for example, we take the 
structure of all (true) propositions to be the totality of what defines the set of all concepts. Then 
we are confronted by an infinite regress of signification because each term only signifies other 
terms which, in turn, signify more terms. How could any concept come to have its own, non-
arbitrary meaning? How can concepts refer to a world outside of concepts? Notice that this is 
really the supposition of the excluded middle which we encountered earlier in our exploration—
it is the assumption that concepts form a classical set. In part, Peirce’s triadic form of the sign 
overcomes this impasse by allowing for the poetic working of language (through the ambiguous 
metaphor, for example) to burst through this assumed structure of propositional “calculus”28. 
Concepts remain open and responsive to poetic resonance as immediate experience of the world 
(firstness).  
 
There is another important way in which concepts remain open and responsive. This responsivity 
arises because terms, as indexical signs, are used by communities of interpreters. What the term 
“red” comes to signify depends on the collective way in which the term is used over time. For 
example, the way that I use the term “red” may influence how you use that term. The meaning of 
a term—the concept—is negotiated between speakers and does not belong to any individual 
 
27 Goedel’s First Incompleteness Theorem is an example of this paradox as it relates to the law-like logic of number 
theory: see Rogers, Identity and Paradox in Habermas’ Approach to Critical Reflection: Metaphor as necessary 
other to rational discourse. 
28 For further exploration, see Rogers, danse sur glace: an experiment in language. 
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speaker as a completed or fixed totality. (This collective aspect of concepts may seem 
unimportant with a concrete concept like “red” but it may become very important with social 
concepts like “justice” or “homosexual”.) Terms, as signs of concepts, draw speakers into mutual 
relationship. The fact that concepts are relational is what allows for the possibility of education 
and, ultimately, the possibility of mutual understanding29. As Levinas points out, the process of 
concept formation is an irreducibly three-person process [2002]. Alone30, an individual could not 
parse abstract concepts from the world because there would be nothing to fix them as definite 
entities. Furthermore, two cannot resolve the issue of disagreement which is necessary to define 
the precise boundary where one concept ends and another begins (for example, when does “red” 
become “orange”). The third party brings the constitutional possibility of judgement [Levinas 
2002]. The third party can adjudicate or decide the impasse of disagreement among two. In 
human language, this three-person form is reflected in the first person perspective (“I” or “we” 
which partakes in firstness), the second person perspective (“you” which partakes in secondness) 
and the third person or general perspective (“they” which partakes in thirdness).  
 
In Peirce’s theoretical framework, a community develops or works out the meaning of a concept 
as an evolutionary process over time. This process might be guided by true narrative reports and 
tends toward the “ultimate logical interpretant” that is a future state of collective agreement. 
Peirce’s theory might be seen to mediate between nominalism and realism. The term, as sign, 
mediates between an initial image (recall the metaphorical abstraction) and a final “ultimate 
logical interpretant” or notion through temporal repetition. Peirce’s formal treatment of the sign 
is similar to Augustine’s discussion of how a mental image is drawn to the notion through the 
word [Augustine 2012]. However, Augustine further provides an important critique of the 
assumption, implicit in Peirce’s theoretical framework, that this process is purely temporal and 
that time is redemptive31.   
 
The responsivity of signs is not limited to human actors. Returning to the example of the single-
celled amoeba, we might recognize that an individual amoeba is brought into relationship with 
other amoebas through signs. Recall that an individual amoeba can become an interpreter of 
external bodies as a result of communication channels. The interpretant is a change in inner state 
of the amoeba. But this interpretant may then become a sign for a succession of interpretants as 
changes in inner state of the amoeba, for example through interactions in a chemical pathway. As 
a result, the individual amoeba might internally process the original sign. Within Peirce’s 
theoretical framework, interior processing of an exterior sign may involve spontaneous aspects 
of firstness (called abduction), comparative aspects of secondness (called induction) and law-like 
aspects of thirdness (called deduction). As a result of the interior processing of the external sign, 
the amoeba will respond in some form of action that impinges back on the exterior world (it may 
move in a particular way, for example, or it may express a particular chemical on its surface). 
After processing the original sign, the response or action of the amoeba can then serve as the 
object of a sign for another amoeba. That is to say, one amoeba can interpret the action of 
another amoeba. This form of interpretation Peirce calls pragmaticism. The “meaning” of the 
 
29 For further exploration of the way in which language is communal and relational, see Rogers, Identity and 
Paradox in Habermas’ Approach to Critical Reflection: Metaphor as necessary other to rational discourse. 
30 Here I am not speaking about particular individuals, but rather a constitutional possibility. Adam could name the 
animals because God brought them to him; he could name himself because of Eve who was taken out of Man. 
31 For further discussion, see Rogers, Beyond Space and Time: Unity and Form in Augustine’s Confessions. 
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sign for the amoeba rests in the action that it elicits. Figure 5 represents the responsive 
processing of signs and compares this process to mechanistic determinism. 
 











 Responsivity (Pragmaticism)     Determinism 
 
Suppose an external entity in the environment is interpreted by a first amoeba as food or energy. 
The amoeba may process this sign and then act. But now a second amoeba can interpret the 
action of the first as a sign of food or energy. In this manner, internal interpretative states can be 
communicated and synchronized. The two amoebas are able to collectively begin to process the 
signs in the environment to learn about sources of food and energy. The results of this learning 
might become systematized by the “third” which refers to the ensemble of all amoebas who are 
mutually interacting. The systematization of learning (through laws and habits) is similar to what 
we usually mean by the term text in theories of language. 
 
Unlike the determinism of Newtonian mechanics, with Peirce’s theory of signs individuals are 
constituted by a community that compels their evolution and growth as an open, responsive 





The process of sign formation is emergent. Emergence is a spiral-like interweaving of the three 
categories. Through emergence, firstness bursts through the systemic text or body of thirdness as 
a new experiential form of secondness. The symbol is the archetypal sign of emergence because, 
Input (external sign) 
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outside of the system in which a symbol normally resides, the relation between object and 
interpretant is arbitrary or pure potentiality.  
 
Emergence results in a new level of sign processing. In our thought experiment on human 
language, we have already encountered the spiral form of emergence as the bursting forth of the 
concept from the level of images. Recall the juxtaposition of images led us to metaphor. 
Metaphor led to abstraction from the image-forming framework. Through naming, abstraction 
led to concept formation. Concepts replicated and became embedded in a concept-forming 
framework. This process resulted in a deeper interiority of sign processing. The sign at the higher 
level—the concept—includes and in some sense fulfills the sign at the lower level—the image. 
 
Likewise, for the case of our community of amoeba’s, we might understand emergence in the 
follow way. First, consider a single amoeba that is able to interpret an external object in its 
environment as food or energy by a change of internal state. Suppose there is a second amoeba 
who encounters the same external object but does not change its inner state; that is to say, it does 
not interpret the external body as food. (Recall that the possibility of error is necessary for a 
change in internal state to be an interpretant and the possibility of error comes from the 
underlying randomness of all processes). Now suppose there is a third amoeba who interprets the 
actions of the first two. (The third amoeba interprets the response of the first two amoebas rather 
than the external object). The third amoeba will encounter a paradox, because the two original 
amoebas have contradictory interpretations of the external body—one interprets it as food and 
one does not. The third amoeba may play the role of judge or adjudicator of the situation as we 
discussed earlier.  
 
But now consider more closely the internal state of the third amoeba before the decision happens. 
Will it not be in an ambiguous resonant state of “yes” and “no”; a state which is informed by the 
contradictory signs from the two amoebas who are interpreting the external body directly? What 
is this resonant state? Is it not an interior state of freedom to make a decision? Is it not also a 
state of resonance? The potential for pattern recognition? The third amoeba recognizes the other 
two amoebas as potential bearers of signs. What is recognized in this moment? Is it not the 
identity of the amoebas as of the same kind as the third? The third recognizes itself in the 
ambiguous relatedness of the original two amoebas and this self-recognition is the recognition of 
amoebas as interpreters of the external world32. Through the third comes identity and self-
recognition. This self is a state of expectancy, a state of potentiality for finding meaning in the 
world. And the self is only made possible by the whole community of individual amoebas. 
Without community, the self reduces to a null point. Moreover, in the threefold process of self-
recognition, the possibility opens for naming of self, for forging of a collective body from the 
unicellular organisms, for the development of immune responses to stabilize that collective body, 
for the generation of a new level of order—a multicellular body. 
 
Yet it is not the self that is important here. What is important is the light that shines through the 
transitory self, that guides the self beyond itself and into the truth.  
  
 
32Here I am suggesting that mutual recognition and identity come from an irreducibly threefold process. For 
further exploration, see  Rogers, A Cautionary Note Concerning Hegel’s Approach to Absolute Knowing. 
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Final Cadenza 
Let’s return to the triadic form of the sign as an infinitesimal interval that mediates between 
finitude and infinity. As figure 6 illustrates, the sign mediates between an object and an 
interpretant, such that each interpretant may become a sign for a subsequent interpretant.  
 




                   
                   
   
 
 
In the differential calculus of Newtonian mechanics, the process of sign formation might be 
taken as a linear chain of successive movements or intervals in time. The causal or deterministic 
relationship between each interval reduces the sign-vehicle to a null point and cuts off the flow 
of time as shown in figure 7. This reduction leads to time reversal symmetry or the spatialization 
of time.  
 
Figure 7: Successive time intervals in Newtonian Mechanics (See also figure 4)    




The richer structure of the triadic interval in Peirce’s theory of signs, however, opens up to the 
possibility of novelty and creativity. Each interval contains the potential for change. At a very 
simple level, we might imagine this as the creation of spacetime. As illustrated in figure 8, the 
sign bifurcates into a resonant structure that can then be interpreted by a third that is embedded 
in a system (or fame of reference). The resonant structure is like the quantum resonance of 
coupled photons. And the third that interprets this—by a process of synchronization—is like the 
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coupled   














In this way, might we not see how a classical interpreting system becomes coupled to quantum 
fluctuations as a sign to its object and interpretant? And might we not see that the opening of 
emergence could move through ever increasing levels of complexity to generate the world in 
which we live as proposed in figures 9 and 10.                           
 
33 For further exploration of this process, see Rogers, A Physicist’s Guide to [Hegel’s] Phenomenology of Spirit: 
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Figure 10: Process of Emergent Evolution 
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